STRIDE, attack trees, and securing distributed boundaries.
4 questions in Security & InfoSec.
A STRIDE threat modeling example works best at one boundary, such as order service to payments service: test spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege, then attach one concrete mitigation to each.
Translate each finding from security language into the same terms the roadmap is already prioritised by — a concrete failure scenario, its business cost, and the cheapest point in the system's lifecycle to fix it — rather than asking for time on the strength of the threat model alone.
A threat model goes stale when architecture, trust boundaries, dependencies, data flows or abuse assumptions change. The fix is event-driven review triggers in design and delivery workflows, not a calendar reminder that ignores real system change.
The endpoint is an unauthenticated internet-facing entry point that writes to your core systems, so treat every field as attacker-controlled. Verify an HMAC over the raw body in constant time, reject stale timestamps, deduplicate on event id, bound the body size, and hand off to a queue rather than processing inline.